Guidelines for improving threat actor analysis

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  • One of the key challenges of analysis cross-border threats is the great diversity in the profile of threat actors. For example, while human smugglers are universally criminalised, research has shown that there is no one typology of smugglers.
  • Due to the limited availability of data (Sanchez 2018a; Siegel 2019; Zhang et al. 2018) there is still a predominantly stereotypical representations of human smugglers. The common overlapping of human smuggling and human trafficking further leads to the development of a narrative which depicts human smugglers as ruthless members of criminal organisations. In fact, human smugglers can be anything from wealthy individuals who enjoy state protection in some places to ordinary people seeking to assist their own communities (Aziani, 2021).
  • In this context, the likelihood of the threat could be expanded upon, with the following two dimension:
    • Likelihood that an attacker has capability to exercise threat.
    • Likelihood that an attacker is motivated.
  • Building on existing studies from the field of cybersecurity, we would like to propose the following 3-dimensional model for building the profile of the threat actor, which in turn would further nuance the assessment of threat likelihood.

Group 1 – Inherent threat actors characteristics

  • Skills (or level of expertise)
    • Does the threat actors have the ability to carry out complex activities (e.g. language, geographical knowledge, access to modes of transportation, agreements with border police)
    • Does the threat actors use multiple types of resources (e.g. means of transport, online advertisement, payment systems, connections in other countries)
    • Does the threat actor have the ability to cover up the traces and stay undetected for a long time (e.g. digital footprint of online activities)
  • Motivation (the threat actor’s desire to carry out an attack/illegal activity successful)
    • Number of attempts (e.g. frequency of groups smuggled, numbers of trips advertised on social media – success videos/photos)
    • Resources allocated to each attempt (e.g. digital effort to market activities, means of transport)
  • Intention (the threat actor’s expectation from the successful action implementation)
    • Financial gain to be expected (cost/individual)
    • Assisting people to cross national borders
    • Exploitation of individuals

Group 2 – Connection between the threat actor and the system threatened

  • Location (the position of the threat actor in relation to the system)
    • Outside the system (e.g. in a different country to the one being transited)
    • Inside the system (within the country being transited) [Note: In this context it could also refer to whether the smuggler is a resident of the country(ies) where the smuggling is taking place]
      This is linked to the type of access the individual may have to different assets (e.g. access to border police; access to information on routes, access to means of transport/safe houses).
  • Privileges (the threat actor’s privileges in the system)
    • In this context it could refer whether the smuggler has political support/support of a wider network

Group 3 – Threat steps

  • Types of actions carried out
    • Recruiting migrants
    • Transporting migrants
    • Providing fraudulent documents
    • Bribing officials
    • Providing food/water
    • Providing shelter

Resources

Aziani, A. (2021). The heterogeneity of human smugglers: a reflection on the use of concepts in studies on the smuggling of migrants. Trends in Organized Crime, 1-27. DOI: 10.1007/s12117-021-09435-w.

Ben Othmane, L., Weffers, H., Klabbers, M. (2013) Using Attacker Capabilities and Motivations in Estimating Security Risk. Workshop on risk perception in IT security and privacy, Newcastle, UK. Available at http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/2013/risk/Cap.-Based-risk.pdf.

Sanchez, Gabriella. (2018). Portrait of a human smuggler: Race, class, and gender among facilitators of irregular migration on the US-Mexico border.  DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198814887.003.0003.

Siegel, Dina. (2019). Human smuggling reconsidered: the case of Lesbos. DOI: 103-121. 10.32631/ccc19.05.

Zhang, S. X., Sanchez, G. E., & Achilli, L. (2018). Crimes of Solidarity in Mobility: Alternative Views on Migrant Smuggling. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 676(1), 6-15. DOI:  10.1177/0002716217746908.

MIRROR has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation action program under grant agreement No 832921.

CRiTERIA has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation action program under grant agreement No 101021866.

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